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Over the past 20 years, state and provincial governments in North America have 
expanded legal gambling opportunities to consumers.  One of the primary policy goals of this 
expansion of gambling opportunities has been to increase government revenues.  Gambling is an 
attractive source of new government revenues because consumers are relatively insensitive to the 
implicit ―tax‖ rate imposed on gambling activities and gambling is a voluntary activity; only 
those who chose to gamble are subject to this implicit tax.  In this paper, we document the 
contribution that gambling revenues make to state and provincial tax receipts, and the extent to 
which variation in gambling revenues contributes to the volatility of tax revenues over time.  We 
adopt an approach from the finance literature.  In finance, the relationship of the return to an 
individual stock to total return in a portfolio, or total return the entire stock market, is often 
summarized by a ―Beta‖ which can be estimated from actual returns on portfolios and individual 
stocks.  We investigate the contribution of gambling revenue, and revenue from other sources, to 
variation in total government revenues, by estimating a beta for various government revenue 
sources in states and provinces in North America over the period 1989-2009.  The estimated 
betas for gambling revenue in many provinces and states are negative, indicating that variation in 
gaming revenue has negative correlation with variation in own source revenues, reducing the 
variation in total state and provincial revenue over time. 
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Legalized gambling provides a small by important contribution to state and provincial 
government finances. In 2006, state lotteries provided $16.92 billion in net revenues to states 
while amusement taxes, which cover wagering at casinos, added another $5.54 billion, and pari-
mutuel taxes contributed just over $300 million to state coffers. While this amount represented 
only 2.36% of total state government general revenues in the U.S. in 2006 (excluding revenue 
transfers from the federal government), the combined $22.76 billion exceeds the revenue 
collected at the state level from such common public finance mechanisms as alcohol or tobacco 
excise taxes, sales of hunting, fishing, or motor vehicle licenses, estate and gift taxes, and 
severance taxes (Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2009). Gambling revenues provide a 
similar percentage of provincial revenues in Canada. 
While government gaming revenues are modest in a relative sense, this paper explores 
the question of whether lottery and gambling revenues can serve an important function in 
diversifying the tax ―portfolio‖ utilized state and provincial governments. In other words, can 
gaming revenues serve to cushion government budgets in during economic downturns?  The 
paper begins with a brief history of gambling in the United States and Canada followed by an 
overview of the pros cons associated with the use of gambling as a source of government tax 
revenue. The paper then turns to an analysis of whether gaming revenues can indeed serve to 
reduce budget volatility and then concludes with recommendations to policy makers.  
 
Historical Background 
 State and provincial lotteries have been a common form of public financing for much of  
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the history of modern government in North America. As noted by Grote and Matheson (2008), 
early public works such Boston’s Fanieul Hall as well as several of the first universities in the 
United States, including Harvard and Princeton, were financed, at least in part, by lotteries. In 
the United States, state-sponsored lotteries remained popular until the early to mid-1800s, after 
which time a general public backlash against gambling, coupled with concerns about corruption 
in gambling, led to the demise of state-authorized lotteries. By 1860 only Delaware, Missouri, 
and Kentucky still sponsored lotteries (Dunstan, 1997). The closure of the Louisiana Lottery in 
1894 ushered in a 70-year period during which no state in the country operated a lottery game. 
  While other forms of legalized gambling existed in the United States in the first half of 
the 20
th century, notably charitable bingo, horse racing, and casino gambling in Nevada, state 
sponsored lotteries returned in 1964 with the introduction of the New Hampshire Lottery. New 
York became the second state to offer a state lottery in 1967 followed by New Jersey in 1970. By 
the end of the 1970s, 14 states offered lotteries, another 17 states plus the District of Columbia 
added games in the 1980s, and 6 more states instituted lotteries in both the 1990s and 2000s 
bringing the total number of states with state sponsored lotteries to 43.  
  Government-sponsored lotteries in Canada resumed in 1968 in Montreal with the 
introduction of the ―voluntary tax,‖ where players could ―donate‖ money to the city government 
to pay for debts associated with the 1967 World’s Fair in exchange for a chance to win prizes. 
While this ―voluntary tax‖ was ultimately declared illegal by the courts, Canadian federal law 
was changed in 1969 to allow for state-sponsored lotteries, and Quebec became the first province 
to offer such a game in 1970. The rest of the provinces followed suit between 1974 and 1976.  
  Casino gaming and pari-mutuel betting also have a long history in the United States and  
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Canada that parallels that of state-sponsored lotteries. Racetracks and gambling houses existed 
early in the colonial days. The first organized horse racetrack in the colonies was constructed on 
Long Island in 1665 while inns and roadhouses commonly had gaming rooms. As with lotteries, 
concerns about corruption and morality led to a decline in legalized gambling throughout the 
1800s, although westward expansion provided opportunities for gambling to flourish in the 
lightly regulated saloons of the boomtowns in the ―wild west.‖ By the early 1900s, casino 
gaming and pari-mutuel betting had been largely eliminated from the United States only to start 
to return during the Great Depression in the 1930s. Bingo was decriminalized in numerous 
states, beginning with Massachusetts in 1931 in order to provide opportunities for charities to 
raise much needed funds, and horse tracks were re-established in 21 states by the end of the 
1930s. By 2010, 41 states offered pari-mutuel betting at either horse or dog tracks.  
Casinos were reintroduced into the U.S. when Nevada legalized essentially all forms of 
gambling in 1931, eventually leading to Las Vegas becoming the unofficial gambling capital of 
the country. While Nevada maintained a virtual monopoly on casino gaming for over 40 years, in 
1976, New Jersey became the second state to legalize casino gaming and an Appellate Court 
ruling in Florida in 1979 gave Native American tribes in the U.S. wide latitude to operate casinos 
on Indian reservations, a right that was solidified in 1988 with the passage of the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act. These pivotal decisions ushered in a tidal wave of casinos across the United 
States so that by 2010, 42 states had casinos operating within their borders. Similarly, gambling 
in Canada has witnessed a significant increase since over the past three decades. Casinos 
currently legally operate in all Canadian provinces. See Figure 1 for a description of current 
availability of gambling in U.S. states.   
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Economics of Lotteries and Gaming Taxes 
  Typically, public finance economists examine a variety of factors in determining whether 
or not a specific tax is desirable. In no particular order, some of these factors include efficiency, 
vertical equity, horizontal equity, and user-pays principle. Gambling revenues earn a decidedly 
mixed review when measured by these criteria. 
In term of efficiency, gambling revenues clearly have their plusses and minuses. 
Administrative costs are high, at least for operating state lotteries. Typically, administration costs 
alone for state-operated lotteries average in excess of 10% of the funds collected and in 2008, 
total operating costs for state-run lotteries in the United States averaged 13.1% of net revenue 
raised excluding payments to retailers. Including payments to retailers, the administrative costs 
of state lotteries are closer to one-third of all revenues raised. On the other hand, the deadweight 
loss associated with lotteries is likely to be low since consumers are relatively insensitive to the 
implicit ―tax‖ rate imposed on gambling activities and since gambling is a voluntary activity. 
Given the fact that only those who choose to gamble are subject to this implicit tax, the presence 
of the lottery should be a welfare increasing activity rather than a welfare decreasing one. 
It should also be noted that money spent by consumers on gambling and lottery tickets is 
money that is not available to be spent elsewhere in the economy. Since spending on other goods 
may be subject to sales tax or other revenue mechanisms, tax revenue generated by casinos and 
lotteries may simply substitute for tax reductions elsewhere in state government. (Fink, Marco, 
and Rork, 2004) This is not only true within states and provinces but also between states. As 
noted by Garrett (2006) the presence of a neighboring state with a lottery is a significant  
5 
influence on whether a state itself adopts a lottery. The presence of casinos in nearby states is 
also frequently mentioned as a prime reason to adopt casino gaming.  
Vertical equity deals with the appropriate rate of taxation across income levels. It is here 
that lotteries and gambling revenues face their fiercest critics. By essentially any measure, 
lotteries are regressive in nature, with the poorest income groups spending a higher proportion of 
their income on these games than richer ones. In their examination of U.S. lottery games, 
Clotfelter and Cook (1988) note that ―implicit tax [for lottery games] is regressive in virtually all 
cases. Vaillancourt and Grignon (1988) come to a similar conclusion for Canadian lotteries. 
While they conclude that Canadian lotteries were somewhat less regressive than their American 
counterparts, they still determined that lotteries are the most regressive form of taxation in 
Canada with the exception of taxes on cigarette. More recent literature such as Price and Novak 
(1999; 2000) and Rubenstein and Scafidi (2002) comes to similar conclusions. Combs, Kim and 
Spry (2008), for example, find that all seven lottery games they examine in Minnesota are highly 
regressive. Indeed, Oster (2004) is notable for predicting that at certain jackpot levels the multi-
state Powerball lottery could actually become progressive, the only such instance documented in 
the academic literature. 
The progressivity and regressivity of casino and pari-mutuel gambling taxes is subject to 
more question. In his seminal study, Suits (1977) used national survey data to ascertain that 
nationwide casino gambling was an activity mostly engaged in by the rich. Of course, at the time 
of the study, only Nevada offered casino gaming, so gambling required extensive travel on the 
part of participants. Borg, Mason, and Shapiro’s (1991) follow-up study examines the gambling 
patterns of people who live in close proximity of casinos and finds that when only local residents  
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are considered, gambling is highly regressive. Considering the widespread expansion of casinos 
across the U.S. and Canada, is it likely that taxes collected on casino gaming have become 
significantly less progressive and more regressive over the past two decades.  
  A tax is horizontally equitable if the tax paid is similar for all individuals of the same 
income level. Obviously, the participation rates and levels for lotteries and gaming vary widely 
across the population. Given the voluntary nature of participation in such activities, however, 
most persons would not classify the lack of horizontal equity as a failing for lottery and gaming 
taxes. 
  The user pays principle suggests that it is advantageous to design taxes systems such that 
the users of particular government services pay for those services through taxes dedicated 
directly to individual government programs. For example, in the United States, road and 
highway construction and maintenance is funded through taxes on motor fuels. Therefore those 
drivers using the most fuel, and theoretically using the most roads and highways, pay larger 
amounts into the highway fund. 
  Lotteries and gaming taxes do not directly qualify as ―user pays‖ taxes, but the proceeds 
from many state lotteries are designated towards specific programs such as education or the 
environment. Of the 43 U.S. states (plus the District of Columbia) that provide lottery games, 
over half earmark all lottery profits for a specific purpose, usually education, and another quarter 
reserve a portion of lottery revenues for a designated government program. Of course, the 
existence of a dedicated revenue source for, say, education, makes it easier for lawmakers to 
redirect other non-directed revenue sources away from education.  
  The empirical evidence does, in fact, suggest that lottery revenues are quite fungible. For  
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example, Garrett (2001) finds that the presence of earmarked lottery funds in Ohio did not lead 
to a statistically significant increase in per-student expenditures on education. Similarly, Novarro 
(2005) uses time series panel data for all 50 states and finds that states with lottery proceeds 
designated to education increase spending on education by approximately 79 cents for every $1 
in lottery profits, while each dollar in non-earmarked lottery profits tends to increase education 
spending by only 43 cents on average suggesting partial but not complete fungibility. 
  The last aspect of gaming revenue that is to be considered is its variability as a revenue 
source. Szakmary and Szakmary (1995) have performed the most rigorous analysis of the 
variability of lottery revenues their relationship to other revenue sources. In contrast to prior 
studies they find that, ―lottery revenues do not destabilize total state revenues, because the low 
correlation of lottery revenues with revenues from other sources offsets the high stand-alone risk 
of lottery funding.‖ Szakmary and Szakmary utilize portfolio theory to test the covariance 
between fluctuations in lottery revenue and fluctuations in other tax sources. A similar technique 
will be used in this paper but extended to cover the fifteen years since their work and the 
Canadian provinces will be added to the analysis. 
 
Data 
Canadian data come from the Provincial and Territorial Government Revenue and 
Expenditures program operated by Statistics Canada.  This annual census of provincial and 
territorial governments contains detailed data on revenues and expenditures based on the 
published financial reports of the various provincial governments.  The data are consistent with 
the Financial Management System developed by Statistics Canada and are available over the  
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period 1989-2008 as CANSIM Table 385-0002. 
Our measure of provincial revenue is Own Source Revenue, an aggregate measure of 
provincial government revenues that includes income taxes, consumption taxes, property and 
related taxes, health and drug insurance premiums, contributions to social insurance plans, the 
sales of goods and services, and investment income.  We subtract provincial revenues derived 
from health and drug insurance premiums and contributions to social insurance programs from 
Own Source Revenues in order to identify revenues generated from specific discretionary 
provincial sources.  Sales of goods and services includes goods like water, land, and used 
structures; services sold include court and probate fees, tolls for transportation, admissions to 
public museums and recreational facilities, and educational services. Investment income includes 
natural resource royalties, interest income and gains and losses on other securities.  The revenue 
variable excludes transfers from other levels of government. 
Table 1 summarizes the share of own source revenues accounted for by a selected group 
of provincial government revenue sources.  This is not a comprehensive list of revenues sources, 
so the shares do not sum to 100%.  On Table 1 ―—― indicates that the province does not collect 
taxes on this source; 0.0% means that the province collects a very small amount of revenue from 
this source.  Personal income and general sales tax revenues are generally the two largest sources 
of provincial tax revenues.  The exception to this is Alberta, which has no provincial sales tax 
and gets significant revenues from investment income, primarily from oil and gas royalties.  
Saskatchewan and British Columbia also derive significant revenues from investment income. 
  Remitted gaming profits make up a relatively small share of Own Source revenues in 
Canadian provinces, between 2.2% and 3.7%.  However, remitted gaming profits are a larger  
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share of own source revenues than alcohol and tobacco taxes in most provinces, and are close to 
the share from motor fuel taxes in some provinces. 
  US data come from the State Tax Collections (STC) program operated by the Bureau of 
the Census.  This program collects detailed sate tax revenue data for 25 categories of tax 
revenues; data are available back as far as 1950 through 2006.  Like the Canadian data, we 
include tax revenues from a number of important sources, but do not analyze a comprehensive 
list of tax revenue sources. 
  The STC program does not include remitted gaming profits as a separate category of tax 
revenues, so we must construct a variable from other data sources.  Gaming tax revenues appear 
in four distinct variables in the STC data: net lottery proceeds, pari-mutual tax revenues, 
amusement tax revenues, and amusement license revenues.  Net lottery proceeds are funds 
returned to the state after prizes and administrative costs have been paid.  Pari-mutual taxes are 
collected on wagers on horse racing, dog racing, jai-lai and other events and include ―breakage‖ 
revenues from rounding on payouts.  Amusement taxes include taxes on casino gambling.  
Revenues for gaming licenses issued to race tracks and casinos fall under amusement licenses. 
The amusements category also contains license revenue and taxes from non-gaming activities 
like movie theatres, athletic events and video game machines, so some portion of these revenues 
are not related to gambling. Since casino and race track betting are not as common as lotteries, 
we use two gaming revenue variables: net lottery proceeds and gaming revenues, which is the 
sum of all three categories of gaming revenues. 
  Table 2 summarizes the share of own source revenues accounted for by each revenue 
source in the US states that operated a lottery for at least 10 years.  The ―years‖ column shows  
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the number of years over which these revenue shares were calculated.  Nevada, which does not 
operate a state lottery but does allow casino gambling, has also been included in this table.  Like 
the Canadian provinces, personal income taxes and general sales taxes account for the majority 
of tax revenues collected by U.S. states.  Five states (Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas and 
Washington) do not collect personal income taxes and four states (Delaware, Montana, New 
Hampshire and Oregon) do not collect sales taxes. 
  Gaming revenues and net lottery proceeds do not account for a large share of own source 
revenues, except in Nevada (21%) which has by far the loosest restrictions on gambling in the 
U.S.  Gambling revenues are more modest but also relatively high in states such as New Jersey 
(4.6%) and South Dakota (5.7%) that have legalized casino gaming in specific cities in the state 
(Deadwood in South Dakota and Atlantic City in New Jersey), and revenues are also high in 
states such as Connecticut (4.3%) that have major Native American casinos that have worked out 
revenue sharing agreements with the state. A few states (Georgia, Maryland, South Dakota and 
West Virginia) get more than 3% of their own source revenues from net lottery proceeds.  Like 
Canadian provinces, many U.S. states collect as much or more tax revenues from gambling as 
from alcohol and tobacco taxes. 
 
Empirical Model and Results 
This paper borrows from the finance literature to estimate the relationship between 
gambling tax revenues and other revenues collected by state and provincial governments. In 
finance the beta (β) of a stock or portfolio is a number measuring its returns to those of an 
alternative portfolio usually defined as the market as a whole. A beta of zero denotes no  
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relationship between the idiosyncratic returns of a particular asset and the return earned by the 
overall market while a positive beta implies that an asset’s value is likely to rise along with other 
assets in the market. A negative beta means that the asset generally decreases in value as the 
market as whole rises. Beta is calculated as  
B = Cov(ra, rp)/Var(rp)                (1) 
where ra measures the rate of return of the asset and rp measures the rate of return of the 
portfolio.  As noted previously, typically the portfolio used in most calculations of beta is the 
portfolio of all assets in the market as whole. 
Beta can be estimated for any individual asset with regression analysis using the rate of 
return of the individual asset as the dependent variable and the rate of return for the market as a 
whole as the lone independent variable. 
  To assess the relationship between variation in specific sources of tax revenues and total 
own source revenues, we estimate a ―beta‖ for each of the revenue sources.  In order to transform 
the statistic from finance to one that can be used in this application, we interpret the percentage 
change in own source revenues as each province or state’s market return and the percentage 
change in revenues from each revenue source as the return on specific ―assets.‖   Based on these 
assumptions, the beta for each revenue source, like the beta in finance, can be estimated from a 
linear regression 
rs,t =  s+ βrOS,t + es,t              (2) 
where rs,t is the percentage change in annual tax revenues from source s in year t, rOS,t is the 
percentage change in own source revenues in year t, and es,t is an unobservable equation error 
term.  We assume that es,t is distributed with mean zero and constant variance σe.  β is the beta  
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for revenue source s, and measures the sensitivity of variation in own source revenues to 
variation in revenue source s over time. 
Table 3 contains the beta estimates for each of the revenue sources in each Canadian 
province over the period 1989-2009.  Each regression had 21 observations and the beta estimates 
were generally significantly different from zero at conventional levels.  Recall that positive beta 
estimates identify revenue sources that vary with total own source revenues and negative betas 
identify revenues sources that vary inversely with total own source revenues.  Put another way, 
revenue sources with positive betas increase the variation in own source revenues over time and 
revenue sources with negative betas reduce the variation in own source revenues over time. 
The estimated betas from different revenue sources in Canadian provinces show wide 
variation with many positive and negative betas.  Corporate income taxes have the largest betas, 
indicating that this source of tax revenue has the largest variation over time. Garrett (2009) 
reported similar results for US states. In general, income general sales tax, general property tax, 
sales of goods and services, and investment income betas tend to be positive, indicating positive 
co-movement between these revenue sources and total own source revenues.  Income and 
general sales taxes contribute to the variation in own source revenues over time.   
The negative betas are primarily in alcohol and tobacco taxes, motor fuel taxes, and 
remitted gaming profits.  The beta for remitted gaming profits is negative in six of the ten 
provinces; the beta for alcohol and tobacco taxes is negative in five provinces.  A negative beta 
indicates that revenues from this source increase when total own source revenues decrease, 
contributing to stability in total own source revenues over time.  The betas on Table 3 indicate 
that variation in gaming revenue over time helps to reduce overall variation in provincial  
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revenues; Szakmary and Szakmary (1995) reported a similar result for US states in the 1980s and 
1990s.  However, from Table 1, remitted gaming profits represent a relatively small fraction of 
own source revenues, limiting the extent to which variation in gaming revenue can offset 
variation in own source revenues over time in Canadian provinces. 
Note that the betas for Alberta differ from many other provinces.  In Alberta, the betas on 
property taxes, investment income, and the sale of goods and services are all relatively large.  
From Table 1, these revenue sources make up about 50% of provincial own source revenues.  
This implies considerable variation in own source revenues in Alberta over time, implying a 
relatively unstable provincial revenue stream.   
  Table 4 contains the beta estimates for each of the revenue sources in each US state.  The 
number of observations in each of these regressions is the number of years appearing shown on 
Table 2, the number of years that each state operated a lottery and reported net lottery revenues 
in the STC data.  The beta estimates were all generally significantly different from zero at 
conventional levels.  An estimated beta of 0.0 on Table 4 means that the estimate was 0.004 or 
smaller. 
The estimated betas for US states shown on Table 4 are similar to those from Canadian 
provinces.  The betas for personal income taxes, corporate income taxes, and general sales taxes 
tend to be positive, indicating that variation in these revenues sources are positively correlated 
with variation in total own source revenues and are more volatile than total own source revenues. 
Alcohol and tobacco taxes, and motor fuel taxes do not have as many negative betas in US states 
as in Canadian provinces, suggesting that these revenue sources contribute more to total own 
source revenue variation in the US than in Canada.  
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Like in Canadian provinces, the estimated betas for gaming revenues and lottery 
revenues contain many negative values.  14 of the gaming betas are negative, and ten of the 
lottery betas are negative in the 39 US states in the sample.  However, the gaming and lottery 
betas are not uniformly negative in US states, and some are large and positive, like in Florida, 
South Dakota, and Maryland.  In these sates, variation in gaming and lottery revenue over time 
enhances the variability of state total own source revenue over time.  Variation in the gaming 
and lottery betas in US states, and Canadian provinces, is probably related to the specific mix of 
gaming and lottery products in place in each province or state.  For example, the beta for gaming 
revenue in Indiana, a state with a number of riverboat casinos, is negative, while the beta on net 
lottery returns is positive.  Net lottery revenues in Indiana rise and fall with total own source 
revenues, while revenues from the riverboat casinos do not. 
 
Conclusions 
  The results provide evidence that gaming revenues and revenues from lotteries reduce 
overall variability in state and provincial revenues over time. The estimated betas for gaming 
revenues are often negative, and the positive values tend to be smaller than the betas for 
commonly used alternative revenue sources such as sales or income taxes suggesting that gaming 
revenues do not fall significantly in the face of declines in other revenue sources.  Variation in 
gaming revenues tends to offset variation in other revenue sources in provinces and sates. 
However, gaming and lottery revenues tend to be small relative to other revenue sources like 
sales and income taxes, limiting the ability of variation in gaming revenues that are negatively 
correlated with total own source revenues to offset declines in total own source revenues.  
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A majority of the revenue source betas on Tables 3 and 4 are positive, indicating 
significant positive correlation among revenue sources in provinces and states.  This positive 
correlation means that total own source revenue will vary substantially over time, potentially 
leading to severe budget shortfalls when these revenue sources all fall together.  Unfortunately, 
unlike private investors who can construct portfolios of assets with both negative and positive 
betas to smooth out market variation, provinces and states must construct revenue streams with 
other properties in mind such as efficiency and equity.  Revenues from many relatively equitable 
and efficient taxes appear to have significant positive correlation over time, placing provincial 
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Table 1: Share of Total Provincial Revenues, Selected Sources 1989-2009 
                     
Revenue 
Source  ALB  BC  MAN  NB  N&L  NS  ONT  PEI  QUE  SASK 
Personal Inc.  23.5%  26.0%  28.3%  26.6%  27.1%  33.8%  35.7%  25.9%  39.3%  22.3% 
Corporate Inc.  8.8%  5.5%  4.3%  4.5%  4.2%  5.3%  9.6%  4.2%  5.2%  4.0% 
General Sales  --  16.3%  17.0%  21.9%  25.6%  23.8%  21.9%  24.2%  15.6%  13.6% 
Alcohol/Tobac
.  2.4%  2.6%  2.5%  2.0%  5.3%  3.1%  2.5%  5.3%  1.9%  2.4% 
Motor Fuels  3.2%  4.4%  4.0%  5.6%  5.5%  5.8%  4.9%  5.6%  3.8%  5.7% 
Gaming  3.7%  2.3%  3.5%  2.4%  3.3%  3.1%  2.0%  2.0%  2.5%  3.0% 
General Prop.  4.7%  6.6%  3.6%  7.6%  0.1%  --  0.1%  7.9%  0.0%  0.0% 
Sale Gds/Serv.  3.5%  3.2%  3.3%  4.3%  5.8%  6.1%  3.8%  8.4%  4.2%  4.9% 
Investment Inc.  41.9%  21.9%  19.0%  16.8%  12.8%  9.6%  4.6%  9.7%  7.0%  27.2%  
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Table 2: Share of Total US State Revenues, Selected Sources and Years 
                       
  Pers.  Corp.  Gen.  Alc. &  Motor        Gds.  Inv.   
State  Inc.  Inc.  Sales  Tobac.  Fuels  Gaming  Lottery  Prop.  Serv.  Inc.  Years 
AZ  20.0%  4.9%  36.5%  2.2%  6.1%  1.3%  1.2%  3.7%  1.1%  4.3%  25 
CA  32.9%  8.0%  26.0%  1.3%  3.4%  1.4%  1.2%  3.8%  4.2%  3.8%  21 
CO  3.2%  3.0%  19.7%  1.6%  6.4%  1.6%  1.1%  0.1%  0.6%  6.8%  24 
CT  16.0%  8.1%  30.1%  3.1%  5.6%  4.3%  2.3%  ---  1.5%  5.4%  34 
DE  26.1%  6.2%  ---  1.7%  3.8%  3.4%  3.2%  ---  2.2%  8.7%  31 
FL  ---  4.2%  46.0%  3.9%  5.3%  3.7%  3.3%  2.1%  0.1%  4.0%  19 
GA  35.7%  4.3%  27.8%  1.6%  4.0%  4.3%  4.3%  0.3%  0.1%  2.3%  13 
IA  26.7%  3.2%  22.6%  1.9%  6.0%  2.2%  0.7%  0.0%  1.9%  3.9%  21 
ID  27.8%  4.1%  25.4%  1.4%  6.8%  0.8%  0.8%  0.0%  2.4%  7.5%  17 
IL  24.9%  6.7%  25.3%  2.6%  5.3%  3.6%  2.3%  0.9%  0.3%  5.1%  32 
IN  26.5%  6.0%  26.3%  1.4%  5.3%  3.4%  1.4%  0.0%  0.0%  4.8%  17 
KS  27.4%  4.7%  27.3%  2.6%  6.0%  0.9%  0.8%  0.8%  0.1%  3.8%  19 
KY  24.5%  4.0%  20.9%  1.0%  4.8%  1.7%  1.5%  4.5%  0.0%  5.2%  18 
LA  15.5%  3.0%  20.6%  1.5%  5.5%  3.7%  1.3%  0.4%  0.5%  9.8%  15 
MA  38.7%  8.4%  15.4%  3.2%  4.0%  3.5%  3.0%  0.0%  0.7%  5.3%  34 
MD  32.1%  3.7%  18.6%  1.9%  5.7%  3.8%  3.5%  2.3%  2.2%  4.2%  34 
ME  23.5%  3.8%  25.4%  4.7%  6.4%  1.2%  1.0%  2.0%  4.0%  6.5%  33 
MI  24.2%  9.9%  23.9%  3.1%  5.1%  2.7%  2.4%  3.6%  3.9%  4.0%  34 
MN  33.1%  4.8%  22.7%  1.8%  4.1%  0.8%  0.5%  0.9%  0.0%  3.7%  17 
MO  29.2%  3.2%  26.8%  1.5%  5.8%  2.4%  1.3%  0.2%  0.4%  6.2%  21 
MT  22.8%  4.3%  ---  2.0%  8.5%  2.3%  0.4%  9.3%  3.1%  12.5%  19 
NE  26.5%  3.6%  26.1%  1.8%  7.1%  0.7%  0.5%  0.1%  0.6%  5.2%  13 
NH  2.7%  12.1%  ---  5.7%  8.5%  3.6%  1.9%  4.0%  23.3%  11.4%  34 
NJ  20.2%  7.3%  22.7%  3.3%  3.9%  4.6%  2.9%  0.7%  6.0%  5.2%  34 
NM  15.2%  3.1%  25.1%  1.1%  3.9%  0.8%  0.4%  0.7%  5.1%  13.0%  11 
NV  ---  ---  39.9%  3.1%  6.3%  21.0%  ---  2.9%  7.3%  5.1%  33 
NY  40.3%  6.9%  17.1%  2.6%  2.1%  2.5%  2.0%  0.0%  17.2%  5.4%  34 
OH  24.4%  4.7%  24.2%  2.8%  6.3%  2.9%  2.7%  0.7%  3.8%  3.2%  32 
OR  43.4%  3.9%  ---  2.3%  4.9%  2.6%  2.6%  0.1%  3.8%  10.2%  22 
PA  20.6%  7.4%  23.5%  3.3%  5.2%  2.7%  2.6%  0.8%  4.8%  3.4%  34 
RI  23.1%  4.4%  21.4%  3.3%  4.7%  3.5%  3.0%  0.5%  2.7%  10.8%  33 
SD  ---  3.2%  32.4%  2.4%  8.1%  5.7%  5.5%  ---  0.3%  15.3%  19 
TX  ---  ---  35.7%  3.0%  7.1%  2.9%  2.8%  ---  0.2%  5.7%  14 
VA  34.2%  2.7%  14.3%  0.9%  5.1%  2.0%  2.0%  0.1%  2.0%  5.2%  18 
VT  21.7%  3.6%  12.0%  3.3%  4.6%  0.9%  0.9%  5.9%  3.6%  7.7%  29 
WA  ---  ---  48.0%  3.0%  5.3%  1.0%  0.9%  11.9%  2.9%  3.0%  24 
DC  22.8%  5.3%  15.2%  0.6%  0.9%  1.8%  1.8%  23.4%  3.7%  2.5%  20 
WI  32.9%  4.4%  22.3%  2.0%  5.7%  1.1%  1.1%  0.6%  0.1%  4.9%  18 





Table 3: Revenue Source Beta Estimates - Canadian Provinces 
                     
Revenue Source  ALB  BC  MAN  NB  N&L  NS  ONT  PEI  QUE  SASK 
Personal Income  -0.22  1.31  1.54  1.22  0.51  1.59  0.96  1.61  1.20  0.01 
Corporate Income  0.82  1.87  2.16  7.67  2.59  0.81  3.09  1.07  0.60  0.54 
General Sales  ----  0.68  0.09  0.83  0.74  0.66  0.57  0.30  1.11  0.14 
Alcohol,Tobacco  -0.13  -0.29  -0.74  -0.59  0.27  2.67  -0.53  0.26  1.54  0.08 
Motor Fuels  0.03  0.17  0.29  0.53  0.03  -0.15  -0.12  1.11  -0.43  -0.12 
Gaming  0.18  -0.33  -0.32  -0.26  -0.64  -3.13  0.32  0.84  -0.15  5.96 
General Property  1.47  0.31  -0.09  0.28  0.81  ----  19.09  0.58  11.43  0.38 
Sale Goods, Serv.  6.56  -0.47  0.23  0.37  0.30  1.25  2.20  2.10  -0.54  -0.09 




Table 4: Revenue Source Beta Estimates - US States 
                     
  Pers.  Corp.  Gen.  Alc. &  Motor        Gds.  Inv. 
State  Inc.  Inc.  Sales  Tobac.  Fuels  Gaming  Lottery  Prop.  Serv.  Inc. 
AZ  0.87  1.55  1.04  -0.08  0.80  0.48  0.38  0.46  0.02  4.15 
CA  1.92  1.44  0.34  1.23  -0.34  -0.05  -0.07  0.86  0.46  0.90 
CO  1.04  3.13  0.87  1.59  0.81  -0.43  -1.10  3.30  -1.16  1.45 
CT  5.84  1.63  0.69  0.00  0.41  1.56  2.02  -1.13  3.46  0.21 
DE  0.74  2.50  ---  -0.17  -2.03  -0.31  0.92  ---  4.89  0.70 
FL  ---  0.97  0.78  0.05  -0.77  6.15  10.37  2.67  -2.08  1.09 
GA  1.29  2.28  0.75  0.64  0.57  2.16  2.16  0.09  4.54  0.96 
IA  1.50  3.06  1.36  0.56  0.96  -0.80  2.65  ---  -0.90  0.88 
ID  1.37  3.03  0.66  0.74  0.07  -2.28  -2.39  -22.90  -0.17  0.33 
IL  1.51  2.40  0.62  -0.25  1.50  0.48  0.57  25.44  4.85  2.06 
IN  0.25  1.88  0.24  0.34  -0.10  -1.30  0.07  -0.75  1.88  0.80 
KS  1.46  2.84  0.71  -0.29  0.44  3.55  2.74  -0.01  1.06  2.72 
KY  1.88  3.91  0.79  3.09  -0.12  -1.26  -1.15  0.29  1.05  1.72 
LA  1.00  2.05  0.53  -0.26  -0.11  -0.39  0.55  0.06  7.92  1.32 
MA  1.23  1.40  1.23  -0.04  0.26  0.23  0.67  -53.64  5.23  1.69 
MD  0.99  2.32  1.10  -0.06  0.52  2.85  5.45  1.13  0.71  3.69 
ME  0.40  1.53  0.36  0.31  0.25  1.77  3.31  19.21  0.10  0.46 
MI  1.76  3.07  1.02  0.42  0.52  0.52  0.79  1.11  0.11  0.67 
MN  1.45  3.03  0.62  2.93  0.13  -3.02  -3.17  -154.75  0.13  3.74 
MO  1.51  2.26  0.39  0.58  1.81  1.82  0.34  -0.02  9.15  2.50 
MT  0.40  1.44  ---  0.17  0.29  1.30  1.95  5.44  0.37  0.47 
NE  0.61  1.64  1.46  1.14  0.12  -0.53  -0.89  -2.36  0.48  -0.36 
NH  0.00  0.47  ---  0.13  0.18  -0.03  0.48  782.26  0.42  0.30 
NJ  9.00  1.69  0.28  0.12  -0.04  0.63  0.89  0.39  2.21  0.61 
NM  -0.18  3.18  0.86  0.01  0.02  2.29  1.66  -0.56  3.37  1.37 
NV  ---  ---  1.92  0.34  0.93  0.37  ---  0.29  -0.83  1.53 
NY  1.20  1.94  0.45  0.45  -0.06  0.80  2.34  -6.94  -0.87  1.71 
OH  1.70  1.01  1.20  -1.35  0.44  1.47  1.98  -1.31  0.42  0.99 
OR  1.43  1.31  ---  0.28  0.90  1.77  1.51  133.43  -0.46  2.58 
PA  1.37  1.99  0.26  0.04  -0.64  1.12  1.38  1.60  0.08  0.40 
RI  1.34  1.63  0.46  -0.68  0.17  -1.06  -0.63  0.99  2.64  2.40 
SD  ---  1.11  0.96  0.43  -0.02  4.57  4.69  ---  1.11  1.88 
TX  ---  ---  0.73  0.35  0.02  -0.25  -0.25  ---  4.26  3.05 
VA  1.89  5.12  0.44  2.06  0.16  -1.47  -1.47  3.49  0.32  1.25 
VT  0.60  0.77  0.57  -0.95  0.24  1.38  3.19  64.62  0.24  0.42 
WA  ---  ---  1.06  0.21  0.87  1.81  1.80  0.87  0.07  3.08 
DC  0.77  0.45  0.96  -0.50  -0.46  0.09  0.09  0.99  1.07  3.26 
WI  1.86  1.09  0.30  0.28  0.72  -0.35  -0.39  1.06  -43.22  0.73 
WV  1.07  1.51  2.12  0.13  0.79  0.31  1.72  -0.86  1.38  0.45 
 